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FUNDAMENTAL lesson that economic policy-
makers learned over the past decade is that microeco-
nomic energy policies can have a significant effect on
the nation’s macroeconomic performance. Early inthe
decade, price regulation in domestic energy markets
led to growing imports of energy and rendered the
United States—the world’s largest energy producer—
impotent to the challengeofthe OPEC cartel indeter-
mining the prices of the world’s energy resources.
Subsequent policy effortsto smooth thedifficult transi-
tion to aworldofhigher-costenergy by preventing any
abrupt rise in domestic energy prices reduced the
incentive to conserve energy, discouraged domestic
energy production, subsidized petroleum imports and
increased inefficiencies in the use of domestic energy
supplies.
These policies increased the demand for OPEC pe-
troleum so that theability ofthe OPEC cartel to raise
its prices (and thereby reduce world output and raise
the dollar prices of goods and services) was substan-
tially enhanced.t Moreover, attempts to smooth the
disruptive effects ofOPEC actions couldnot keep pace
with the changing realities in world energy markets.
The energyprices assumed to prevailat theendofeach
transition continually fell short of the market price,
contrary to federal energy policy intentions.
The elaborate regulatory scheme for oil was finally
abandoned in February 1981. In the case of natural
gas, the recognition that regulations were leading to
1
SeeJohn A. Tatom, “Energy and Its Impact on Economic Growth:
A Supply-Side Miracle for the Eighties,” Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, Working Paper 82-005, 1982. Also Claudio Loderei-,
“Theoryand Evidence about the Structure ofthe International oil
Market: 1974—1979,” Graduate School ofManagement, University
of Rochester, Working Paper GPB 82-5, 1982, provides evidence
thatOPEC has operated successfully as a cartel hut that this alone
has not accounted for higher energy prices. I-Ic emphasizes that
energy policiesworldwide havecontributed tohigher prices in the
manner detailed below.
increased shortages of gas and a consequent increased
reliance on imported oil led to the passage of the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA). Akin to the
earlier efforts to preventabrupt energy price increases
in the transition to a free market for oil, NGPA pro-
vided for phased decontrol ofthe nation’s natural gas
market. Changing world energy market conditions,
however, rendered this plan obsolete as the pace of
allowable price increases and decontrol became in-
adequate to accomplish a smooth transition. In addi-
tion, there emerged a growing recognitionthat phased
policy changes create perverse economic incentives
that thwart the achievementof the policy objectives.2
As a result, pressnre has been growing to decontrol
natural gas markets more rapidly than scheduled
under NGPA.
A major obstacle to the decontrol ofthe U.S. natural
gas market has been thepotential effect on the price of
natural gas paid by residential nsers (voters). Analysts
also have argued that natural gas decontrol will have
adverse macroeconomic effects similar to those experi-
enced following OPEC energy price increases.
This article provides an alternative perspective,
which indicates that the adverse economic effects of
decontrol are substantially overstated. These negative
impacts are largely reversed when the effectofnatural
gas decontrol on the world oil market is taken into
account.3
2
Knowing that future prices will be higher than current prices, gas
producers are induced to postpone production of some known or
suspected deposits until after decontrol. This reduces the pre-
decontrol supply of gas and increases scarcity. Thus, the phased
decontrol of prices, instead of smoothing the transition, actually
worsens the dotnestic gas shortage.
~ article draws heavily upon the more detailed analysis in Mack
Ott and John A. Tatom, “Are There Adverse Inflation Effects
Associated with Natural Gas Decontrol?” Contemporary Policy
Issues, a supplement to Economic Inquiry (October 1982). pp.
27-46.
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Table 1
U.S. Consumption of All Forms of Energy and of Natural Gas
(quads1)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1976 980
Totalenergy 3352 39.18 4408 5299 6683 7071 7227
Natura gas 597 900 1239 1577 2 79 1995 2044
Natural gas as
a perc nt of
total energy 78°a 230°o 28.1°/ 298% 326°o 282% 268/
SHARE OF NATURAL GAS USE BY SECTOR
Residential 205% 243/n 25 9°~ 25 5% 22.9% 25 2% 24 U/n
Corrirnercial 57 72 86 9.4 113 128 135
lndusr’al 594 522 482 65 43.8 48 41
Electricutility 109 132 144 152 186 162 184
Transportation
(pipeline) 22 29 29 33 34 30 29
1000% 1000% 1000% 100.0% 100.0?’ 1000% 1000%
A quad i one quadrillion Britishthermal units 2Total may notadd to 100 due to rounding
SOURCE Energy Information Administration US Department of Energy 1980 Mnua! Report to
Congress volume 2 and Monthly Energy Review
from 1962 to 1968. Production groxsth actually did not
begin to decime until after 1973 whc n the excess in
From 1950 to 19,0. thedomestic consumption of all x entoric s (reserx es) caused hx i egulatory changes in
types of energy grew at an axcrag’ annual tate of 3,5 the earls 1960s had be( n eliminated. In th early
p ‘reent with natural a consumption growing at a 6.7 1970s, natural ga prices began to iespond to thc gross -
percent rate. The growth of both total energy and ing shortage Nesertheless. production continued to
n’itural gas co isumption was particularly rapid during decline until the passage of NGPA and the rd ited
the 1960. before slox ing dramatically in the past d Powerpi tnt ‘md Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (FUA).
cade. As table 1 shows con umption ofnatural gas ‘is a
fiaction of total enc rg\ tose from about one sixth in
1950 to about one—third in 19i0 then dechned to
slightly oscr one—fourth in 1980.
These laws lessened restrictions on the pricing of
natural gas, decontrolled the price of new gas from
deep wells and other high—cost gas, but extended re-
strictions on the industrial and utility use ofnaturalgas
and on the construction of new gas—fired boilers. The
phase—out of wellhead price controls, to he completed
by the end of 1984, presumed that gas would then sell
at the equivalentof a relatively low 1984 price ofcrude
oil. The limitations on industrial antI utility gas tie—
mand, in practice, allow such uses residually; that is,
they’ allow exceptions to the restrictions only to the
extent that other usesof gas do notexhaust total natural
gas production. 4
Sce Jai—Hoon Yang. “The Natni-c and Origins ofthe U- S - Enei-gv
Cusis this Rerun. dub 1977) pp 2—t2 snd Paul \% \taeA~os Tible 1 shows th it the tot il use of nitni al ~asw is
and Bobcu-t S - Pindvek. The Economics oft/ic Natural Gas Short— , . ,
ai,r 1960—1980) (\outh Holland Puhlnlsuni. C omp ins 1975 low erin 1975 thin in 19i0 N ituial gis usc rose folloss
especially chapter 1, pp. 1—28. ing the enactment ofNGPA, although the share of gas
In large part, the decline in the growth ofnatural gas
consumption was the result ofgovernmental control of
the pricing and distribution of natural gas.4 Control of
ivelihead natural gas prices fi-om the early 1960s led to
declining reserves of natural gas relative to its produc-
tion and, since 1968, absolutely declining reserves. In
addition, the numberofnew gaswells drilled declined
20FEDERAL RESERVE BANK Off ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1982
Table 2
The Real Price of Natural Gas1—Oelivered to Final Users and
at the Welihead $11000 (cubic ft)
950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981
Residential 1288 1480 1505 1409 1192 1.360 2075 2214
Commercial 0888 1031 1128 1039 0841 1075 1913 2065
Industrial r “1 0374 0 702 1 689 1 545
Electric utilities2 L°366 0.485 0582 OSt4j 0319 0,516 1 258 1 494
Transportation3
(pipeline) NA NA NA NA 0230 0314 1041 1.235
Wellhead 0121 0171 0204 0.210 13187 0354 0904 1030
‘The ratio of the indicated priceto the implicit pricedeflator for GNP 972 pnces
Industrial and electnc utilityprices are not availableseparately priorto1957 the pricesfor1950—65 are
average pnces for industna and utility customers
Pipebne fuel pnce is not available pnor to 1967
SOURCES Energy Information Administration US Department of Energy Annual Report to Con
gress 1977 and 1980 Monthly Energy Review(August 1982)
the wellhead price during the 1950—70, 1970—SO and
1975—80 subperiods. In contrast, residential prices
grew muchmore slowly than thewellhead ordelivered
industrial prices.
The diversity ofdelivered natural gas prices reflects
diff~rent delivery and administrative costs. Decontrol
of the wellhead price of natural gas will not raise the
price fbreach ofthe various users of natural gas to the
same extent because of these difl~rences.In the in-
dustrial and utility sectors, the share of the wellhead
cost of gas in the delivered price is very high, so that
percentage changes in the welihead price result in
similar percentage changes in delivered price. The
The decline in the growth of natural gas consump- -
share of the weflhead cost of gas in the delivered price
tion also is due to a rise in the delivered price of gas, .. . -
- ——- to residential customers is much smaller, as can he
primarily since the OPEC embargo of 19e3—e4. As .
seen from the difference in relative prices; a given
table 2 reveals, the real priceof natural gas rose signih-
- . - percentage change m the weilhead price leads to a
cantly from 1950 to1960 forall users. thendeclined to a
much smaller percentage change in the residential
level in 1970 roughly’ equal to its 1950 value. From
— ‘ .. . price. 19 iO to 1980, however, the real price of delivered
natural gas rose dramatically’, almost doublingfor resi—
- - . - . The effectofcontrols on naturalgas prices appears to
dential users and risingby even larger multiples forthe .. . —
have been quite extensive, especially since 19i3, vet
commercial, industrial, utility’ and pipeline sectors. . gas fuel prices have risen more i’apidly than crude oil
During the 1950—70 period, the real wellhead price over the last 12 years. Chart 1 show’s an index of the
of gas rose at only a2.2 percent rate, but then surged at realprice ofgas, found by deflatingthe producer price
a 15.8 percent rate from 1970 to 1980, or, even more index (PPI) ofgas fuels by the implicit price deflatorfor
revealing, an 18.8 percent rate from 1975 to 1980. ‘I’he private business sectoroutput, and an indexof the real
percentage movements in the industrial and electric price of crude petroluem, the PPI for crude petro—
utility- prices conformed closely to the growth rate of leuin, adjusted for the crude oil control program, de—
in total energy still declined slightly. The tilt toyvard
residential use ofnatural gas and away from industrial
use (especially electric utility use) before NCPA also
can he seen by comparing the pattern of use in 1975
with that in earlier years. Despite the rise in the resi-
dential share from 1970 to 1975, total residential use
was virtuallyunchanged. Residentialuse declined only
after NCPA, while electric utility use recoveredsharp-
ly. Since utility use is restricted to the residual after
residential demands, increased use by utilities would
not have been possible without thecombined effects of
increased total gas production and reduced demand by
other, primarily residential, users.
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flated by the sarue price index.5 In 1981, the index for
the price of gas was somewhat above that of crude oil.
The delayed response of gas prices to the 1973—74
run—lit) in the real price of crude in the United States
ciu, beobserved in chart 1 . In 1977—78, however, when
real oil prices flattened out, the price of gas changed
I ttle, despite the considerable leeway exhibited em-—
herfor regulated real gas pnces to rise. From inki— 1981
to mid—1982. when real crude prices fell, the rise in
natural gas prices slowed sharply. Such casual evi-
dence raises doubts about the usefulness of extrapolat—
3
The i’rnde oil prier’ is acljustc’cl to reflect the actual c’osi of oil to
refi nci’s rat Iic’ r tI,an cli a oc stic’ sr‘liii~ p ‘in-s. Tbc’ cIilk ‘c’n cc arises
from thc’ c’ntitlernc’nt sistem. ‘l’lic- c’ntiili-riient adjustment imply
acIds Usc’ cliflei’cniia] betwc’c’n tlic’ logai-iilnn of the eornpositc’ ‘c’—
fineraeqni boo cost of ernclc’ oil and cIsc’ domestic ic-finer ac’c~nisi-
irons cost to tIre Iogarithos of tic’ PI’l for crude oil.
ing controlled natural gas prices upward based upon
regulatorv alloyvances.
I/jc’ Ltfftef oiF~,’,ee,ieenntro(on tit.,s.
•Vqtns’pJ Gas Jars-at
In some essential respects fi.e. - at the margin), natu-
ral gas was decontrolled in November 1979 when the
svellhcad prices of new’ (discovered since February 19,
1977), deep ( IE,000 feet or more I. and other high—cost
gas were totally decontrolled by NCPA.6 On the other
‘Sec Energy lnfornoaticrn Aclnnnistration. U.S. f)epartnmrenrt of
Enc’rgv. .4,inoolIfcpco’t to ()orrgn’ssdO-SI h). pp. 2——S. for a sc’becl’
irlc’ ofec’iling prices uncles’ NGI’A. of course, imports of natural
gmIs.c’spc’ei ally li’cr ii (Sins ada mmcl NIt’ ‘cic’o are frc’c’ of U - S - wellIi (‘act
price controls and icon
1
to bc pi’ic’c-dl according totIn’ svsrrlclpric’c’ of




1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1916 1978 1980 1982
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i,and, some categories of natural gas remnain subject to
svelll,ead priceceilings that will likely he efft’ctiy-e well
hevond this decade. ‘ For the purposes of the analysis
in this article, decontrol refers to the eon,pleteab-an—
donment of wellhead price regulation and the repeal of
FUA. The hypotheses developed below already apply
to post—1977 developmnents under phased decontrol.
There are two shortage—creating effects of ann- price
control progn-ani that holds a price below its market—
clearing k’s-el, The first effect is that less of that good
will he produced than would be at the higher price.
Removing the controls increases the (juantitic’s snip—
plied. In the case of natural gas, this potential mere—
nient to supply comes from three sources: (I.) known
gas deposits reeoverahle at higher cost hut not profit-
able to produce at the current controlled price—or
more profitable to produce later when prices are ex—
pected to be higher; (2) suspected gas deposits whose
anticipated development and production cost could
not he covered at current prices; (3) a sl,ift in prociuc—
tion techniques so that currently’ producing oil wells
would produce, at a higher price of gas relative to tl,at
of crude oil, less oil and more gas.
The second effect of a price control program is that a
larger quantity of that good will he demanded than at
the higi,er market—clearing price so that, to he effoc—
tive, the pricecontrol program must involve an alloca-
tion or rationing scheme. Es-idence of tl,is rationing is
apparent in the different prices in the intrastate and
the interstate n,arkets.
During the 1960—78 period, the intrastate natural
gas markets were free of controls so that purchasers
conic! avoid rationing by paying a market clearing
price—lin,ited only’ by time cost of competing f’uels—
and suppliers couldrespond to these higher prices. Of
course, the diversion of supplies to this m,,arket inten-
sified the shortage in the regulated interstate market.
‘I’he intrastate market, primarily in Texas, Oklahoma
c’c’ Paul Bc-isnett and tIc-I,ra K Liens tner, ‘‘Natural Gas CcsnrIsc) Is
mind 1) ec’ontrh,’’ FecIe rat Resei-vc’ B am,
5
of Nen’ Yrirk (lucideny
Reeienc yy’inrccr 1 9Sl~S2d,pp StY—GO. They cite studies indicating
tI rat iv 1990, 2-S to 38 peret’s it of n atu ‘al gmis ‘vonId rc’rdr mu rI d~s in—
I rcmlic’d Iminer NCPA.
st-’md,errs,c,re. time availability of gas at a us arkc’ t cli‘a rimig price mrs
Its ese intrastate nnarkc’ts probmsblv md cinch sc,me hrnis to r’c’locatc’ -
‘She lower Iikciifs, mc mci of instern, Iptnl n sitsmral gas simplifies prod uc—
lion clc’eisir miss an ‘ci lcmnsg—n’angc’ plan murig Lv rc’cln scm rig cuergv Insider—
taints-, ‘[hims ispart of the fScvcmral,lc’ ins, pad:t cmi is atni-al gas dlc’rc’sds Ia—
ticmms cmii time N cmrthc’ast re gicmn pied ictc’d Im yJr sc’pI’ K alt, II ems mv Lc’e
amid Ro hc’rt A- I ,c’cmmcc Vu tim i’d! Cccs Decoof ,‘dm!: ‘-1 ,\‘o,’tlscastI Icc/nm-5’
End I I’c’nspectic’c’ it n cc:rgv anci Ems vircln inn c’r t,d Policy Cci,t c’r,
Harvard University, July 19821.
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Table 3
Natural Gas Price Paid by Electric
Utilities in Interstate and Intrastate
Markets (dollars per 1000 cubic feet)
and Residual Fuel Oil Price
1970—2 197 7 197 76 19 75
Intrsategas 032 044 088 140
Intrastate ga ase 1 09 1 91 .63
Residual uel oil 06 3 1 38 04 22
‘NCPA was enacted in 1978 bnngingthe cat asta e natu aI gas
price unde federal contro
2Taken from Richard P 0 Neil The interstate and Intrastate
Natural Gas Markets MonthlyEnerg Av iw ( nuary 198
table3, p vii Pricesgiven there (per million BTlJ} we econ erted
by ashmated BU per 1000 cubic feet
The priceof residual fueb oil to steam electric utility plants ( eats
per million OTt)) converted to dollarsper 1000 cubic feet The
1970— 2data are estImatedusing theproducerpn e side fo
residual fuel oil
SOURCE Monthly nergyReview
and Loumsia ia. had gas pried s dnmm n~g this pc~ iod sul,—
stantialls in excess of the intem state market.
As I os’s n in t mbk .3 electi ic utihtic s willingis paid a
mucIi higher price fbm natum al cras imm the inti ‘ist’ite
m irket th us tht s paid us the inter st itt’ niarket. Nott
that th as cm ‘igc price of g-ms in the intm‘ st’mte mam kc
55 is close to the B I. — qtns aientcost of fuel oil. \\ hen
NUP ~ brought the intrastatc market under federii
price control tIn differemmcc lletss m~th ii,tra— amsd
into rstate price s effectis ely was ullified. Thc imphc ‘i—
tion (If the e irher sharpis highem nnc-omstroiled intma
state gas pric~sand the recent discrepancy hetw en
the price of fIs ‘I oil and the pried s of gm is that gas has
been ineff’c’ientls illocat ci o loss ci —y ‘duc d uses. I
lost antIs se s mi ii m us -ml g-ts derc g ‘it or has
assumed tb-mt me ‘isum ed on ‘i B k has’s. the pm ‘cc o
satmmm ii “as and fne oil it tim boris tip (It Id I,
eqmnat ‘d arid tI at the prmc ‘ of n~ tur’ll “a ~ or him ist to
ecjualit~ tI, ii mcI -t ge d ft e ml m c - The um I a —
ising p ~snmpto , ha - I,c en tha n’mtra J gas uI pt o—
leuni f c-Is r big mi~ smml st’trmt hic for gas thins it is
1 ~ ‘d h~ t drcrc laticmn sy I Ii -~ se rim tu tI a s ss II
mc ad pm ice to r sc I ntil Ic ‘y e I gas Inc sp -iall
5cc ncr’ liii in, emcsrr kdrnnr,m-,t - ctmcmr, SS Dc’pa tr m mit
icr’s trmr /r,srs ofl’c )uommrmc’tffcc is of 1cc ci rats / Dc, of ml sri
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As a result, total energy is more abundant and should
become cheaper relative to all other goods and ser-
vices. Yet, in the eom,ventional analysis, the reverse
occurs.
J\-A-t5) BA DLLONTBOIL WILL
LO\—YF-I~R0:11. P1111W-S
Industrial misers and electric utilities currently are
restrictedin their purchases ofmiatural gas. As a result,
theyare forced to use fuels like oil or coal that are more
costly. In main’ im,clustrial processes and in electric
generation, fuel substitution possibilities are ted,-
nieallv unlimited, In itt additior,aI gas eam,not he
obtaineddue to direct legal restrictions. Thecontribu-
tion of energy to the value of output is correctly mea-
sured by the price of oil that firms pay, and this is the
relevant measure offuel cost that enters into thedeter-
minationofprices ofoutputincluding electricity. Such
firmscouldprofitably payup tothecurrentprice offuel
oil for the energy equivalent in natural gas; fIr each
unit of gas substituted, oil use and oil imports svould
decline by the amount of oil that is not purchased.
Currently, some residential users are not allowed
access to natural gas. As a result, theytoo are forced to
rely on higher-cost fuel alternatives. Like industrial or
utility users, they would be willing and able to pay
munch more forgas thanthe current price, and, ifsuch a
switch were allowed, they svould reduce their pur-
chases of higher-cost alternative fuels such as electric-
ity, fuel oil or coal. ~
With no changein natural gas production, decontrol
wouldlead to gains in efficiency and aggregate output,
and lower prices of final goods amid services. Fligher
prices ofnatural gas would tend to reduce gas use by
those svho currently are able to obtain all the gas they
wish to use. This gas would be diverted to users svho
value natural gas more highly, hut can only buy gas if
residem,tial and comn,ercial customers do not. Overall
energy prices clearly will fall for purchasers who cur-
rently cannot buy gas or are limited in tI,eir ability to
purchase it, and they will reduce their reliance on
higher—cost alternative fuels.
ml Bemmnett arid’ Knsenstrser, “Natural Gas Controls’ show that the
monniher ofannmial new residenstial gas enmstomssers rleehin,ed sharply
after 1970, from abommt 800,000 per year [rods 1960—69 to nmncler
400,000 per “ear irony, 1975—77. Following phased deeontrcsl amid
its attendant smmpplv I m,c’reasem, hook—ups rose hs- rm,mlrc- thann
200,000 per ‘-cam- fromss 1978—80. Ccmnversions tcn m’esidenstiab gas
heating also wc-re- rmttioned nirider controls - dieehinsing irons ahou
-400,000 11cr ‘ear fi-omu 1960—69 tc) under 100,000 in 1977. Sul,se-
c
1
uently, these- eoniversiomms snnrgecb to ,ilmmscist 600,000 per year
1980.
These snhstitutions reduce the demand for OPEC
oil. Given, the pattern ofuse of miatural gas, differences
in the responsiveness of demand by residential and
other users of natural gas, and prices that prevailed at
theend of 1981, for each 1 percent rise in tl,e delivered
price of natural gas for industrial and electric utility
purchasers, the demand for OPEC oil would decline
by 0.4 percent.’2
Decontrol allows gas prices to rise, providing an
incentive to boost dou,estie gas production and dis-
place some ofthe U.S. and worldoil demand with U.S.
gas, further reducing the demand for OPEC oil. De-
control also increases the responsiveness of U.S. gas
and energy supplies to changes in the world price of
oil. A domestic price ceiling on domestic natural gas
results in a completely unresponsive or inelastic sup-
ply of gas. Producers market only the amount that is
profitable to produce at the fixed price. Increases or
decreases intheworldprice ofoil or energy resultin no
direct changes in the incentive to produce domestic
gas. When the price ceiling is lifted, the responsive-
ness ofdemand facing otherproducers ofenergy, espe-
cially OPEC, rises, putting dosvnward pressure on
their prices.
A price leader, dominant firm in an industry, or a
cartel is limited in its incentive to raise prices by the
supplyresponse ofother producers andby the demand
response ofpurchasers, since higher prices reduce the
quantities demanded and increase the quantities sup-
pliedby competitors. 13 The OPEC cartelhas benefited
‘
tm
This estimate is derived inc Ott and Tatom, “Are There Adverse
Inflation Effects’?” hased on econometric evidence in Robert S.
Pindyck, The StnmctisreofWorld EnergyDemand(Massmsehusetts
Institute ofTechnology Press, 1979).
m.nTherelevant theory ofpricing applied here for the OPECcartel is
often referred to as the theory ofthe do,ninarst firm. l’l,is is the
theoretical basis fbi- the jesuIts in Ott and Tatom, “Are Tho-’re
Adverse Inflation Effi:cts(”, For a more detailed discussion,, see
(1eorge J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Richard I),
Irwin, Inc., 1968) or his The Theory of Price, 3rd ed, (Macmillan,
1966), especiallvehapter 13, appendixB and nnathemnatieal note 7’
This theory has been used Ibr OPEC in the studies cited in
footnote 1 ahove, amid in Johns A. Tatom, “Ensergy Prices acid
Capital Formation, 1972—1977,’’ tIns Review (May 1979), pp. 8—9:
Steven E. Plammt. “OPEC Is Not a Cartel,” Challenge(November—
December 1981), pp. 18—24: amid Rodney 1’, Smith, ‘‘I’, Sean’eh of
the ‘Just’ U.S. Oil Policy: A Review ofArrow amid Kaltacid More,
journal ofBnm,sine,s,s (Jannmary 1981), pmi. 87—116. Other discussions
ofOPECpricingbehavior inclmmde those in WilliamD, Nordhaus.
‘‘Oil amid Eeonscmnnie Perlbm-nnanee in Im,dnmstrial Ccmuntries, -‘ Brook—
Omgs’ Papers’ on EconomicActivity (1’. 1980), pp 341—99; Rohem-t 5,
Pindyek, “Sonic Long—’Iem’mn Pn-ohhenns in OPEC Oil Pricing, -‘
JournalofErmergy onclDer:eiopnmermt (Spring 1979), ~ip 259—72; E.
I-Irsyilieza andl II, 5, Pindvek, “l’rieing I’olieies for a two—part
exhaustihie resource cartel: Theease dlf OPEC.” En rcnpean Leo—
rsoolic Review (August 1976). pp. 139—54; amid Philip K. VcrIeger,
“The Deternnummants csf Official OPEC Crude Prices.” i’l,c: Rc’niere
of Econcmozic’s cord Stati,stic,s (May 19821, pp. 177—83.
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Figure 1






from U.S. natural gas price controls because its price
increases are not automatically matched by increased
U.S. natural gas prices that would evoke larger gas
supplies, and because the demand for OPEC oil is
larger under U.S. natural gas price controls. As a re-
suIt. OPEC has found it attractive to raise prices more
than they would have if U.S. energy producers could
compete with OPEC,14
Three factors, then, lower the world price of oil
under U.S. natural gas decontrol: interfuel substitu-
tion, increased domestic energy production, and an
increased responsiveness of U.S. energy production to
changesin the world price ofoil. These factors reduce
the demand for OPEC oil and raise the responsiveness
of the demand for OPEC oil to OPEC price changes.
Theeffects on the demand forOPEC oil and its price
arise fronn some simple considerations of economic
theory. World energy prices have been determined
largely by OPEC oil prices since 1973; OPEC faces
competition, however, from competing producers of
oil, as well as from producers of close substitutes such
as natural gas, coal and nmuclear power. In this environ-
nuent, a cartel acts as a “dominant firm,” realizing that
‘TIne analysis here assun,es that OPEC acts as a don,inam,t firm, hsut
is unaffected if only some rnemnllers ofOPEC are the residnial
suppliers arid mII’ice—setters while others are “price—takdmrs,” that is,
producing all they desii-e at the OPEC price, hike ndmn-OPEC
prodricers ofoil,
other producers will produce and sell as munch of their
products as they desire given the economic environ-
ment, including the OPEC (nil price. Thus, OPEC
faces a derived demand that, at each price ofoil, is the
difference betweenworld demandfor oil andtheener-
gy supply of other producers.
Given factors other than price that influence the
demand for OPEC oil, a demand curve such as that
shown in figure 1 can be derived. At higher prices,
OPEC demand is smaller, because some competing
producers ofoil produce more and purcbmasers ofworld
oil buy less. The latter reaction arises fbr two reasons:
some users restrict activities in which they use oil, and
other users switch to a more abundant supply from
competing non-oil energy producers. OPEC, a domi-
nant firm, sets its price for oil, taking these interactions
into account as well as its cost ofproducing oil so as to
maximize wealth(essentially thepresent value ofits oil
reserves). At such an optimal price, P1 in figure 1,
OPEC producers sell all the oil demanded of them.
As a result of an effective ceiling price of natural gas,
the supply ofU.S. natural gas is smaller, and the U.S.
and world demand for oil is larger than it otherwise
would he. In addition, the responsiveness ofworld oil
demand tochangesin the OPEC price is redticed. The
OPEC demand is larger (the curve is further to the
right) and steeper under price controls. When the
OPEC price rises above P1, world oil demand and the
residual portion facing OPEC cannot fall as mtichbe-
cause there can be no increase in U.S. natmirah gas to
compete with OPEC oil at higher energy prices.
Decontrol would reduce the component of U.S.,
world and OPEC oil demand created by controlled
natural gas prices. The demand would shift from D to
D’ in figure 2. Moreover, the responsiveness ofOPEC
demand would be increased so that time demand at
price P1 would become more responsive to OPEC
price changes than under price controls. At any price,
OPEC wonild find that their total receipts were more
responsive to price changes, If the OPEC price is
raised from P1 along D’, U.S. natural gas priceswotmld
respond to individuals’ attempts to misc more gas and
less oil, and U.S. natural gas producers would respond
by producing more. If the OPEC price were lowered,
sales of OPEC oil would expand more because some
energy’ userswould switch from U.S. natural gas to oil,
natural gas prices would fall in line with oil, and U.S.
natural gas producers would cut back production.
Both types of changes in the demand fhr OPEC oil
would induce a lower price. Rednictions in the market
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Figur. 2







prices are kept the same than if some of its market
shareis recouped by loweringthe oil price somewhat
and passingthe revenue losson to competing produc-
ers ofoil and energy. In efi~ct,OPEC would replace
the output of their competitors as well as filling any
increase in energy demand due to the lower energy
prices with enlarged OPEC production. In addition,
the revenue increase from anyOPEC pricecutwould
beenhanced, because OPEC could displacehigh-cost
U.S. natural gas through their pricing actions.
An Earlier Example: U.S. Crude Oil
Decontrol
The decontrol of the U.S. market for crude oil in
February 1981 provides auseful test ofthese hypoth-
eses)5 In that instance, the analysis is simpler andthe
effectsare smaller thanwouldbe the case withnatural
gas decontrol. Prior to decontrol, domestic crude oil
prices were determined through an entitlement sys-
temsothatoilsold forthesameweightedaverage price
for almost all purchasers, regardless of the source.
Thus, theallocation ofcontrolled oilwasmoreefficient
than is currently the case with natural gas; each pur-
chaser paid the same price for crude oil. This meant
there was no artificiallyinduced demandfor crudeoil
created by restrictingthe availability ofthe controlled
~SeealsoTatom, “Energy and Its Impact on EconomicGrowth.”
crude to some purchasers. At a price above the con-
trolled price received by sellers ofdomestic crudebut
below the import price, any purchaser could buy as
much or as little crude oil as desired.
In other respects, however, the analysis is virtually
the same: decontrol allowed domestic production and
prices to be responsive to worldprices. As aresult, the
demand for OPEC oil fell, given the OPEC price, as
U.S. oilpurchasers reducedquantitiesdemandedand
U.S. producers expanded the quantities supplied.
More important, theefl~ctive responsiveness ofU.S.
oil producers to changes in OPEC prices was in-
creased. Thus, the demand for OPEC oil shifted as
described in figure 2, leftward and flatter. Both
changes reduced the OPEC price.
The sequenceofoil price movements in the United
States following decontrol was dramatic. In February
1981, the cost ofimportedcrude oil to refineries was
$39~OOper barrel, while the cost of domestic oil in
January, the monthprior to decontrol, was $32.71 per
barrel. At thetimeofdecontrol,therewas concernthat
domestic prices of oil would rise to eliminatethedis-
crepancy between domestic and imported oil. The
domestic oil cost did rise, but peaked at $36.97 per
barrelIn March. The world price, however, fellsteadi-
ly, as did the domestic price after March. Within five
months, theavenge costofcrude oil had WIen below
its level in the monthbefore decontrol. In June 1982,
theaverage refineracquisition costwas belowthecon-
trolled domestic price in January 1981; that is, the
free-market U.S. priceandthe world pricewerelower
than the controlled U.S. pricehad been in the month
beforedecontrol. From the firstquarter of1981, when
decontrol occurred, to the third quarter of 1982, the
refiner acquisition cost of imported oil fell 14.4 per-
cent, despite a rise in the U.S. price level of 9.7
percent; that is, thereal priceofimported or world oil
has follen 22 percent since decontrol.
Some observers attribute the recentdecline in real
oiland energy costs to the worldwide recession rather
thanthe decontrolofthe U.S. crude oil market. Sucha
view is inconsistent with the historical evidence. Be-
fore 1974, theproducerpriceindexforcrudeoilandfor
fuels, related products and power (deflated by the
implicit price deflator for business sector output) ex-
hibited no cyclical tendencies, at least in terms of a
significant statistical relationship to measures of slack
such as the Federal Reserve Board index ofcapacity
utilization or the unemployment rate.
Chart 2 shows the U.S. refiner acquisition cost of
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Chart 2
Real Oil Prices ~
(1972 dollars)
14
[], Refiner acquisition cast of imported crude oil deflated by the implicit price deflator for
private business.
from 1974 to the second quarter of 1982. The realprice
of oil during the period ofOPEC control has not been
dominant firm’s market share in the oil and energy
marketsdue to competition and then, when the outpnt
cyclical, contrary to the recent cyclical explanation of ofIran and Iraq declined sharply after 1978, by amajor
falling OPEC prices. For example, a cyclical view rise in demand faced by other OPEC members.’°
would have required a falling price in the 1974—75
recession and rising prices during the cyclical expan~
sion from 1976 to 1980. Contrary to this view, chart 2
shows a slight downtrend in prices from 1974 to the
end of 1978, a sharp rise in 1979 and early 1980 and
again in early 1981. Until the first quarter of 1981, the
pattern is easily explained by amoderate erosion ofthe
‘°Cvclical movementsin worldoil prices, however,are not mconsis~
tent withthc underlying ec000iruethcory, Givenprices, acyclical
decline in worldoil demand Falls principally on the OPEC market
share. Because the responsiveness of demand for OPEC oil is
raised by’ such a change, a cyclically lower world price would he
optimal. The po nt above, however, isthat the possihility forsuch
cyclical movements has heeu dominated by other developments.
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Table 5
Energy Price Effects of Natural Gas Decontrol
Aternative Assumptions of 11w Own~Price
Elasticity of Natural Gas Supp!y.
00 0.2 ‘0 20
US pica o~ natura- qas
Electric utmittes 3709~ 31 7’~, 97’. 27%
Resoon~:aheatirg 20 8 17 9 57 78
World price of cmdc ci 22 5 25 5 379 ~9 4
US p’ice & erte-gy
ifupi relalec products ana powe’j 92 1’ 8 724 4’ &
4,~f1,: 144*. &kS DECONTROL
~ I ‘N ~ iii’ ‘\ Dr C
If ‘if 0,
The extent ofthe decline inthe world price ofoil due
to decontrol depends on the responsiveness ofOPEC
oil demand to changes in the OPEC price, the respon-
siveness of U.S. natural gas supply to changes in the
U.S. price ofnatural gas, and the effect ofdecontrol on
the lhrmer. The OPEC oil demand is more responsive
(elastic) to changes in the OPEC price, the larger the
responses of world demand for oil or competitors’
energy supplies to changes in the OPEC price, or the
smaller the market share of the price—setter in the
world oil market.
Many behavioral parameters are reqtnred to esti-
matetbe pattern of oil and gas price changes that occur
when decontrol closes the gap between oil and gas
prices. Depending on the magnitude of these param-
eters, the gap will be closed by relatively more down-
wardpressure on oil prices, and less upward pressure
on gas prices. Indeed, if the responsiveness of U.S.
natural gas stspply is large enough, the gap will he
closed, with oil prices declining to equal a lower price
of U.S. natural gas.
For a broad range ofparameter estimates, the price
ofnatural gas rises substantially less than a convention-
al estimate like that in table 4. More important, tinder
no plausible conditions does the overall index ofener—
gv prices rise due to decontrol; the depressing efihet of
decontrol on the world oil price and, hence, on the
prices ofall petroleum products and other competing
energy sources outweighs any upward effect ofdecon-
trol on the price of U. S. natural gas.
‘‘The downward presssn’e on oil prices dsisomates any up’~vard
pressure on gas prices because, while U. .S. productiomi of oil a,id
For example, table 5 reports the percentage changes
in the U.S. relative price of natural gas, the world
relative price of crude oil, the U.S. relative price of
energy, and the priceofgas for residentialheatingwith
some standard assumptions about the relevant
responses. U) The eflbct of the size ofresponses ofU.S.
natural gas supply to changes in its price, the own—
price elasticity ofU.S. natural gas supply (cc), is shown
by considering thur valttes ranging from no response
whatsoever (c~ is 0), to a fairly sizable response (cc; is
2). ~ The first column of table 5 shows that, ftr a
completely unresponsive natural gas supply, the gap
between gas and oil prices is closed liv fairly similar
gas are similar on a BTU hasis, oil consnmption is sonets larger,
especially in prorluction ofmarketed output. The hypothesized
decline in overall energy prices due to decontrol is quite robust
and virtually independent of parameter assumptions. In the
appendix to Ott and Tatom, ‘‘Arc There Adverse ltsllation
Eflhcts?” equation 1.6. sufficient (not necessary) conditions For a
hill in energyprices are thatthe U.S. elasticity ofsupply ofnatural
gas exceed that (hr oil and that the elasticityof demand for OPEC
oil is less that, 2. Of the many unresolved debates on the size of
energy marketparameters, thesetwo areperhaps the mostreadily
agreed upon.
“These assnusptions include an elasticit of worlrl oil demand of
0.5, an elasticity ofsupply for competitors of t).2. and a market
share (hr OPEC set at the relatively low level in IV/19S1 of39
pei’cent. The latter assumption rednecs the magnitude of the oil
pncc response substantially, Alternative parameter values are
discussed in the appendix to Ott and Tatomn. “Are There Adverse
lisfiation EfleetsC’.
‘“the percentage ehassge in the stipplv of U. S. natural gas is a
function of the percentage poi it rise in its pr~~’, so that a It)
percent misc is, the tJ. S. natural gas price is assumed to is,crease
supply by 0pe’eent, 2percent, 10 lx’rcesit or20 perceist, iI’e,; isO.
0.2. 1.0 or 2.0, respectively. Paul A. )rlacAvoy a,sd Rohert S.
Pindyck. “Alternative Regulatory Policies for Dealing with the
Natural Gas Shortage.” The Bell Jonned efEconorrncsa sd Man-
agement Science lAutsnssu 1973). pp. 454~9S.and MacAvov and
Pmndyek, The Economics of the Natural Gas’ Shortoge. present
cyide,see that shows this elasticity’ is onity’ isorler a phased deco,—
tm
1
experimcii t. Under insin ediate decontrol, it Wosi In he larger
for reaso ‘is gi“en in lootnt,te 2.
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issereases in the price of natural gas for electric utilities
and decreases in world oil prices. Even without a
response liv U.S. natural gas producers to decontrol,
energy prices decline.
At the other extreme in which natural gas supply is
quite responsive, all prices are shown to decline sub—
st;mtiallv; the decline in energy prices is about the
same magnitude as the increases associated with each
of the two OPEC price shocks since 1973. There exists
an intermediate supplyelasticity, an Er.;ofl.6, atwhich
the natural gas pricewould he the sameafter decontrol
as its controlled level.25’ Focusing on the middle elas-
ticities, most of the effect of decontrol is to lower oil
prices rather than raise gas prices, with energy prices
declining hv between one—eighth arid one—quarter.
The macroeconomic effects of decontrol are coti—
sidcrahly smaller and less seusitive to the parameter
assumptions. Natural gas decontrol, based on prices
prevailing at the end of 1981, wottld lower the relative
priceof energy. The principal macroeconomic effects
would he to lower the general level ofprices and to
raise potential output. For the middle two cases in
table 5, the price level quickly declines 1.1 to 2.2
percent, so that a like reduction temporarily occttrs in
the inflation rate in the year following decontrol.
Capacity output and productivity are raised by similar
amounts equallyquickly. Due toa rise in the profitabil-
ity ofplant and equipment associated with lowerener-
gy prices, investment also would be raised temporari-
ly, further increasing capacity outputand productivity.
The long—run effect of natural gas decontrol is to raise
capacity output and productivity by’ 1.5 to 3 percent.
Naturalgas decontrol cannot raisethe pricelevel. To
raise prices of goods and services, decontrol would
haveto raisethe relative priceof energy resourcesand,
thereby, reduce real output. The relative priceofener—
gv is determined in world markets amid is based oss the
scarcity of energy resources. Since tiecontrol camiot
reduce the energy supply, it camsot raise energy priees
or the price level.
We have examined the conventional analysis of de-
control that assumes real oil prices are unaflbcted b~’
o tOguinglv, an estimated elasticityofsipply ofnew gas of 1 .6 kim
the Oklahousafist ritstate market was nshtained he Cl ring Lic~s’ and
Donald 10 Irry, ‘‘Au Eomostiet,’ie Model uf TIse lotrastatr’ Cas
\I,trket in Oklahoma, ‘‘ is Pat I R. Lowry ann1 Sliirlev Stanphill,
Regional Supply and Demand ofCoal arid Pet rolenn,for Energy
Production (Bure-au of l
3
usiuess and Economic Research Men,—
puts State University, 1979).
U.S. energy policy. Under this worst—case scenario,
wellbead prices would double, and delivered prices of
natural gas would rise under immediate decontrol liv
tip to 50 percent, raising the general level of prices by
about 0.4 percent within one year, tesnporarilv adding
a like amount to mneastirenl nfiation. \Vhen the effect of
increased competition in world energy markets is
taken into account, however, such a conclusion is re-
versed. Decosstrol reduces the dlemand for OPEC oil,
lowering the world priceofoil and energy prices in the
United States, even if natural gas prices are higher.
Increases in nattiral gas prices are not even inevitable.
Platisible values of the elasticity of U.S. natural gas
supply could lead to a substantial increase in competi—
tion in the world energy market and lower the optimal
price flir worldloil by more than theexisting discrepan-
cv between gas and oil prices.
Ilie eonft,sion over the price effects of natural gas
decontrol arises from an incorrect analogy to the two
surges in the real price of OPEC oil over the past
decade. Decontrolofgas redttces the scarcity ofenergy
resources rather than increasing it, so the correct anal-
ogy is the experience with decontrol ofthe U.S. crude
petroletun market in 1981, which lowered world ener-
gy prices.
Relative gas prices may fall tsndcr decontrol hut the
more likely scenario is that they’ willrise 9.3 percent to
27.5 percent in relation to the prices of goods and ser-
vices generally, while overall relativeenergy’ prices, as
a result, will decline by about 12 percent to25 percent.
The analysis of energy effects on the macroeconomv
leads to the conclusion that potential output will he
raised as a result of decontrol iw 1.5 percent tni 3
percent, and the general level of prices would tend to
he 1. 1 percent to 2.2 percent lower than otherwise
within about one year of full decontrol.
Wehave notbeen concerned herewith the distribu—
tional implications of natural gas decontrol, hut the
general pattersi of adjustments includes switching from
gas to other fhrms of energy itt many areas of pm-odtsc—
tion (and in i-esidential tsses), while users of gas that
currently are constrained, especially’ indt,strial users
and electric utilities, will tend to switch toward gas.
The dist,-ihutional efihets of decontrol that arise from
this broader analysis indicate that the issue is not con—
stimers versus energy producers. 21
.iiFom-a discussion of distribution eflhets of isatumal gas decootol
u ocherthe no veotiuu;,l assumptinn Usat oil prices sri- uuafleeted,
see J. A. Stockflseh, “The IncomeDistrihtitioo Efh,ets ofa Natural
Gas Prier’ lnere;tse,” Conteustporary Policy /ssues, 5suppleuseot
to Economic Inqnis-y (Oetohcr 1982). pp. 9—25. Frsr intei’regiossal
rhistnilsutinsn etlects, see Kalt, Lee audI Lensoc, ‘‘Natural Gas Dc—
n.’t,otml: .A Northeast lid tistri,ll Pcrspr’etive-.
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Some consumers (those who misc relatively snore gas
;md relatively less electm-icitv, coal, oil and oil products
both directly and in the goods amid services they pur-
chase) are likely to be affected adversely by nattual gas
decontrol. Other consumers (forexaniple, users of rel-
atively more gasoline and electricityboth directly amid
in the goods and services they purchase) will benefit
from decontrol.
Among energy producers, it is important to distin-
gttish owners of wells from processors. Processors,
such as gas pipeline companies and gas distribtition
companies, will likely thee reduced profit margins
temporarily and smaller markets, while gas well own-
ers could gaits by decontrol. In the oil sector, the
refiners’ market would tend to expand, improving
profit margins temporarily, while owners of oil wells
(inclttding OPEC wells) will tend to he affected
adversely by the removal of the component of their
demand created by the regulatory constraint on com-
petitors.
31